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Mind wandering “Ahas” versus
mindful reasoning: alternative routes
to creative solutions
Claire M. Zedelius* and Jonathan W. Schooler
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, USA
Based on mixed results linking both mindfulness and its opposing construct
mind wandering to enhanced creativity, we predicted that the relationship between
mindfulness and creativity might depend on whether creative problems are approached
through analytic strategy or through “insight” (i.e., sudden awareness of a solution).
Study 1 investigated the relationship between trait mindfulness and compound remote
associates problem solving as a function of participants’ self-reported approach to
each problem. The results revealed a negative relationship between mindfulness and
problem-solving overall. However, more detailed analysis revealed that mindfulness was
associated with impaired problem solving when approaching problems with insight, but
increased problem solving when using analysis. In Study 2, we manipulated participants’
problem-solving approach through instructions. We again found a negative relationship
between mindfulness and creative performance in general, however, more mindful
participants again performed better when instructed to approach problems analytically.
Keywords: mindfulness, mind wandering, creativity, insight problem solving, analytic problem solving, compound
remote associates problems
Introduction
The question of what makes some individuals more creative than others has long fascinated
researchers and laypeople alike. Interestingly, stereotypes of creative individuals seem to fall
into two very diﬀerent categories. On the one hand, creative individuals are often made out
as being creatively successful because they exhibit high levels of concentration and are able
to devote their full attention to their creative work. On the other hand, creative individuals
are often portrayed as highly volatile and easily distractible characters with scattered minds.
These stereotypes describe remarkably diﬀerent styles of thinking. The ﬁrst description suggests
a tendency toward mindfulness, which is often deﬁned as the tendency to attend to and
be aware of present moment experiences (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Brown et al., 2007). The
second description conveys a tendency toward mind wandering, or frequently and often without
conscious intention shifting attention away from the present environment (Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006; Schooler et al., 2011)1. Mindfulness and mind wandering can be viewed
as opposing constructs (Mrazek et al., 2012b). In the context of creativity, this opposition
raises an intriguing question: Which style of thinking is conducive to being creative? Or is
1We distinguish mind wandering from daydreaming, which we deﬁne as (likely deliberately) engaging in mind wandering
in the absence of a primary task. It is conceivable that an individual may be highly mindful while focusing attention on an
internal train of thought, or daydream.
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it possible that both mindfulness and mind wandering have
distinct beneﬁts for creativity?
Mind Wandering and Creativity
Previous research provides mostly indirect evidence for a
relationship between individual diﬀerences in traits related to
mindfulness or mind wandering and creativity. For instance,
individuals with attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),
which is known to be associated with increased mind wandering
(e.g., Shaw and Giambra, 1993; Barkley, 1997), tend to score
higher on creativity tests and report more creative achievements
in their everyday life than individuals without ADHD (White
and Shah, 2006, 2011). Moreover, individuals with reduced latent
inhibition, which is deﬁned as the ability to screen previously
irrelevant content from conscious awareness, score higher on
creativity tasks such as the generation of novel and useful ideas
(Carson et al., 2003; Fink et al., 2012), and lifetime creative
achievements (Carson et al., 2003). Likewise, individuals with a
broader attentional focus, who tend to suﬀer from distraction
by irrelevant or peripheral stimuli, have been found to produce
more and better creative output (e.g., poetry; Kasof, 1997). These
ﬁndings, though indirect, suggest that a tendency toward mind
wandering is beneﬁcial for creativity.
Direct evidence that mind wandering can have a beneﬁcial
eﬀect on creativity comes from a study that investigated the
eﬀects of dispositional as well as situational mind wandering in
a creative incubation paradigm (Baird et al., 2012). To assess
creativity, participants were asked to generate original ideas for
unusual uses of objects (alternate uses task). In-between blocks
of this creativity task, participants were interrupted for 12 min
(serving as an incubation interval) and asked to perform a
diﬀerent task. This task varied in how demanding it was, and
thus how conducive to mind wandering. The results showed
that the greatest increase in creativity post-incubation occurred
when participants had performed an undemanding task, which
left room for mind wandering. In addition, the study showed
that greater dispositional mind wandering, assessed with a
questionnaire, was associated with greater creativity overall. This
ﬁnding is in line with a more recent survey study showing
that an increased tendency to mind wander was associated with
increased self-reported creative behavior and engagement in
creative activities (Baas, 2015). Though the process underlying
this relationship is not entirely exposed, Baird et al. (2012)
have proposed that mind wandering may support creativity by
increasing unconscious associative processing, which is thought
to facilitate the generation of novel ideas or untypical solutions to
problems.
Mindfulness and Creativity
In contrast to these ﬁndings, there is also evidence linking
mindfulness to greater creative performance. This evidence
comes from a set of studies by Ostaﬁn and Kassman (2012),
who investigated both dispositional and situational mindfulness
in relation to creative problem solving. To assess creative
problem-solving, the authors used verbal puzzles (so-called
insight problems) that are initially hard to solve due tomisleading
problem representations and require restructuring, or viewing
an element of the puzzle in a diﬀerent way (e.g., Ohlsson,
1992; Schooler and Melcher, 1995). In a ﬁrst study, Ostaﬁn
and Kassman (2012) showed that a greater tendency toward
mindfulness, assessed through the Mindful Attention Awareness
Scale (MAAS; Brown and Ryan, 2003), was associated with an
increased chance of solving the puzzles. In a second study, the
authors showed that a brief session of mindfulness meditation
improved both situational mindfulness and problem solving. The
authors concluded that mindfulness beneﬁts creativity, possibly
because mindful attention to present moment experience reduces
the tendency toward habitual responses when searching for the
solution to a creative problem.
In a more recent study investigating the relationship between
mindfulness and creativity, Baas et al. (2014) distinguished
between diﬀerent aspects of mindfulness. They found that the
ability to focus attention and act with full awareness (assessed by
the MAAS) was associated with decreased performance on the
alternate uses task. However, another aspect of mindfulness—
the ability to observe and attend to various stimuli—was
associated with increased creativity. A study by Colzato et al.
(2012) found similar results, this time focusing on mindfulness
practice rather than diﬀerences in trait mindfulness. They
found that mindfulness practice that involved open monitoring
meditation (which promotes the ability to observe and attend
to various stimuli) increased creativity in an idea generation
task, whereas focused-attention meditation (training the ability
to focus attention and awareness) had no eﬀects on creativity.
Distinct Routes to Achieving Creative
Solutions
To make sense of these mixed results, we think that it is
important to deﬁne creativity not only in terms of the quality
of creative output (e.g., an original idea; an untypical solution
to a problem), but in terms of the processes through which this
output is achieved. Research examining creativity in terms of
creative processes has shown that people can achieve creativity
through very distinct routes (e.g., Kounios and Beeman, 2009;
Nijstad et al., 2010). This point can be illustrated by the following
testimonies from creative individuals asked about their creative
process. First, this is how Suzanne Collins, novelist and author
of the bestselling book series The Hunger Games, describes the
process that led to her idea for the books’ story of youth ﬁghting
death matches:
“I was lying in bed, and I was channel surﬁng between reality
TV programs and actual war coverage. On one channel, there’s
a group of young people competing for I don’t even know; and
on the next, there’s a group of young people ﬁghting in an actual
war. I was really tired, and the lines between these stories started
to blur in a very unsettling way. That’s the moment when Katniss’s
story came to me.” (Margolis and Collins, 2008)
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In contrast, this is how author Erik Larson describes how he
got the idea for his bestselling “non-ﬁction novel” Devil in the
White City, which tells the story of the historical serial murderer
H. H. Holmes:
“I was in the search then for a book idea, and I thought, well,
wouldn’t it be interesting to try to do a real historical murder, do
a non-ﬁction book about a historical murder and try and evoke
some of the same eﬀects, some of the same sort of sense of the
past? And so I actually just quite systematically began looking for
a good murder to write about. You don’t get more systematic than
looking at—my ﬁrst book from the library was the ‘Encyclopedia
ofMurder.’ And so seven letters in, I came toHolmes.” (Lamb and
Larson, 2003)
Collins’ testimony illustrates the process of having a creative
insight, often also referred to as an Aha-experience. Insight is
characterized by the sudden realization of a novel idea or solution
(“themoment whenKatniss’s story came to me”; emphasis added).
While to the individual an insight can seem to come out of
nowhere, research suggests that it is the product of unconscious
mental activity, involving the spreading of activation in semantic
memory and the re-combination of information (Mednick, 1962;
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2008), which gives rise to
awareness only once an idea or solution is found (Schooler et al.,
1994; Schooler and Melcher, 1995; Smith and Kounios, 1996;
Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003). In stark contrast to this process
is that described in Larson’s testimony, which is a more analytic
strategy. It involves the deliberate search for an idea or solution,
during which the individual is aware not just of the output of the
search but also of its incremental progress, involving, for instance,
conscious reasoning and considering or rejecting inadequate
ideas or wrong solutions (Ericsson and Simon, 1993; Kounios
et al., 2008).
Previously, insight and analytic problem solving have often
been studied in isolation, or by comparing performance on
diﬀerent tasks. For instance, researchers have sometimes used
insight problems as a designated tool to investigate creative
insights and logic problems to investigate analytic strategic
problem solving (e.g., Ansburg and Hill, 2003; see also
Ostaﬁn and Kassman, 2012). Findings that emerged from this
methodological approach have supported the idea that insight
and analytic problem solving involve qualitatively diﬀerent
processes. For instance, only insight, but not analytic problem
solving suﬀered from verbalizing one’s thought processes
(Schooler et al., 1993; Schooler and Melcher, 1995). However,
while insight problems may lend themselves more to insight
solving than logic problems, there is evidence that some insight
problems can be solved through analytic strategy as well (e.g.,
Weisberg, 1986; MacGregor et al., 2001; Bowden et al., 2005).
Thus, an alternative way to compare insight and analytic problem
solving is to use one type of task that can be solved equally well
through insight as through analytic strategy.
A frequently used task that ﬁts this requirement (and that
has shown to correlate with performance on insight problems;
Schooler and Melcher, 1995), is solving compound remote
associates problems (CRA problems; e.g., Mednick, 1962; Bowers
et al., 1990; Kounios and Beeman, 2009). CRA problems consist
of word triads (e.g., “board, magic, death”), of which each word
can all be combined with a single fourth word (“black”) to form
a compound word or phrase (“black board,” “black magic,” “black
death”). Participants are presented with the three target words
together and asked to generate the common fourth word in a
limited amount of time. What makes these problems diﬃcult to
solve is that the solution is only weakly associated with each of the
target words, and retrieving it from memory requires accessing a
broad semantic network of associations, while inhibiting habitual
responses, or strongly associated words that are not the solution
(Fiore et al., 2001; Harkins, 2006; Benedek and Aljoscha, 2013).
A common observation with regard to CRA problems is that
participants sometimes report having found a solution through
insight, by simply letting the answer “come to them,” and
sometimes through an analytic search strategy. Moreover, these
self-reports are typically associated with diﬀerent kinds of errors.
When people approach problems in an insightful manner, they
tend to make frequent errors of omission (timing out or failing to
provide any answer), but relatively infrequent commission errors
(providing an incorrect response). In contrast, when problems
are approached with analytic strategy, they tend to make frequent
commission errors but infrequent omission errors (Kounios et al.,
2008). This pattern is in line with the idea that while analytic
solutions are achieved gradually, with conscious awareness
of potential (but often wrong) solutions under consideration,
insight solutions come to conscious awareness suddenly, in an
all-or-nothing manner, without access to intermediate steps or
wrong solutions.
Neuro-Cognitive Processes in Insight
and Analytic Problem Solving
Evidence from behavioral studies suggests that unconscious
spreading of semantic associations takes place rapidly and
spontaneously upon being presented with CRA problems. For
instance, when shown word triads that either comprised solvable
CRA problems or were simply incoherent, “insolvable” triads,
within few (2–12) seconds, participants were able to make
accurate intuitive judgments about whether a triad was a
solvable CRA problem or not without being able to report
the solutions to the solvable problems (Bowers et al., 1990;
Baumann and Kuhl, 2002; Bolte et al., 2003; Bolte and Goschke,
2005; Topolinski and Strack, 2008, 2009). Other studies have
demonstrated that presenting CRA problems “primed” their
solution, as evidenced by faster recognition of the solution word
(e.g., Beeman et al., 1994). Interestingly, research has found that
this semantic spreading process was disrupted when individuals
followed instructions to actively search for the problem solutions,
which likely induced a more analytic approach to the problems
(Topolinski and Strack, 2008). These ﬁndings are in line with
the notion that qualitatively diﬀerent cognitive mechanisms (i.e.,
unconscious spreading of information vs. conscious search) are
involved in insight and analytic problem solving.
There is also evidence from functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) studies
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showing that participants’ self-reports of whether they
approached a CRA problem with an insight approach or
analytic strategy correspond to diﬀerences in neural activity
that can be detected already before a solution is found, and
even before a problem is initially presented to the participant
(Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003; Kounios et al., 2006; Kounios
and Beeman, 2009). The fact that the activity precedes the
process of solving the problems suggests that it corresponds
to diﬀerent ways of approaching a problem, not to responses
to its solution. Speciﬁcally, it has been suggested that activity
leading up to insight solutions (which is most prominent in the
temporal lobes and mid-frontal cortex, and speciﬁcally in the
anterior cingulate cortex) is involved in priming the brain to
process lexical and semantic information, and to detect weakly
activated, subconscious solutions, and switch attention to them
when they are detected (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2009; Kounios and
Beeman, 2009). In contrast, activity leading up to solutions
found through analytic strategy (which is most prominent in
the posterior, or visual cortex) has been suggested to correspond
to focusing attention outward and toward the presented task
stimuli (Kounios and Beeman, 2009).
More recently, a behavioral study has demonstrated that the
way people direct their attention before attempting to solve CRA
problems aﬀects their likelihood to solve them through insight
or analytic strategy (Wegbreit et al., 2014). Participants were ﬁrst
asked to perform one of two visual attention tasks, which diﬀered
in how broad or narrow of a focus of attention they required
(i.e., an object identiﬁcation task, which required participants to
pay attention to a broad space, or a ﬂanker task, which required
them to focus their attention narrowly and ignore stimuli in the
periphery). If participants had focused their attention broadly,
they solved more subsequent problems with insight than when
they had focused their attention narrowly.
Other research has focused on more stable, or trait-related
individual diﬀerences. A study by Kounios et al. (2008)
investigated resting-state brain activity, recorded through EEG
during a period of rest, and found that diﬀerent patterns
of activity corresponded to tendencies to successfully solve
CRA problems through insight or analytic strategy (Kounios
et al., 2008). Participants who more frequently solved problems
through insight (rather than analytically) showed greater right-
hemisphere activity and more diﬀuse activity (i.e., increased
in the center and decreased in surrounding areas) in the
occipital cortex. This kind of diﬀuse activation was speculated to
correspond with creative individuals’ tendency of to have a broad
attentional focus and suﬀer from greater distractibility (Kasof,
1997; Ansburg and Hill, 2003; Carson et al., 2003; Fink et al.,
2012).
The Present Research
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that solving the same types
of problems through insight versus strategically is associated
with diﬀerent neuro-cognitive processes and diﬀerent attentional
styles, solving through insight being more strongly associated
with diﬀuse or broad attention and solving through analytic
strategy being more strongly associated with outwardly focused
attention. Based on this research, we predicted that mindfulness
and it’s opposing construct mind wandering relate diﬀerently
to creative problem solving as a function of whether a
problem is approached through insight or analytic strategy.
Speciﬁcally, we predicted that individuals with a greater
tendency toward mindfulness (or a lesser tendency to mind
wander) should show increased performance when approaching
problems with analytic strategy, but decreased creative problem
solving performance when approaching problems through
insight (henceforth summarized as “diﬀerential relationship
prediction”).
Two studies were conducted to test this prediction. Our
investigation was based on the premise that mind wandering
and mindfulness can be conceptualized as the polar ends of a
continuum (Mrazek et al., 2012b). In line with this premise,
individual diﬀerences in mindfulness/mind wandering were
assessed using a self-report scale of mindful awareness and
attention (MAAS). Creative problem solving was assessed using
CRA problems. In addition to solution accuracy, we also assessed
the types of errors participants made. In Study 1, problem-
solving styles were measured by asking participants at the
end of each trial to what degree they had approached the
current problem through analytic strategy or insight (see Kounios
and Beeman, 2009). In Study 2, we went a step further and
explicitly instructed participants to employ a particular problem-
solving approach when attempting to solve CRA problems. Both
studies have were approved by the university’s internal review





Participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Seventy-six participants completed the study. The only exclusion
criterion was that participants were excluded from analysis if they
failed to solve a single remote associates problem. Six participants
were removed for that reason. Of the 70 participants included in
the analysis, 15 failed to complete the demographic questions.
Demographic data from those who answered the questions (16
male, 39 female) indicated an average age of 36 years (SD = 13;
minimum = 19, maximum = 66). All participants were residing
in the USA. Education levels reached from high school to Ph.D.
degrees. The mean education level was equivalent to an associate’s
or bachelor degree.
Procedure and Materials
First, before engaging in solving a set of CRA problems,
participants received the following instructions to communicate
the diﬀerence between insight and analytic strategy as distinct
problem-solving approaches: “There are diﬀerent ways of solving
these puzzles. Sometimes, they are solved with STRATEGY. That
is, you try out a word without knowing whether it is the right
answer, but after thinking about it strategically (e.g., trying to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 834
Zedelius and Schooler Mind wandering “Ahas”
combine the word with each of the three given words), you ﬁgure
out that it is indeed the right answer. Other times, problems
are solved with what we call INSIGHT. That is, a word may
come to mind spontaneously, it just pops into your head, and
you immediately recognize that it is the right answer. We are
interested in the way people come to solutions in this task.
Therefore, after entering an answer you will be asked to indicate
to what degree you found the answer through strategy or insight.”
Participants received 30 CRA problems (see Table 1 for a
list of the problems), which were presented in a random order.
Each trial started with the presentation of three target words,
and the instruction “you have 1 min to solve the problem,” along
with a text box in which participants could type their answer.
The target words, instruction line, and text box remained on the
screen for 30 s. During this time, participants were able to type
in the text box and revise their typed response as much as they
liked. After 30 s, the problem would disappear. Thus, within 30 s,
participants could either provide the correct answer, an incorrect
answer (deﬁned as commission error), or time out (i.e., provide
no answer, deﬁned as omission error). After this time window,
participants were presented with an insight rating scale (adapted
from Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003) to indicate the problem-
solving style with which they had approached the problem.
Because a CRA problem may not necessarily be approached
exclusively with insight or analytic strategy, but potentially also
with a combination of the two, we gave participants four answer
options: 1= just strategy; 2=mostly strategy; 3=mostly insight;
4 = just insight (see Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003; Chein and
Weisberg, 2014).
After the CRA problems, we assessed participants’ tendency
toward mindfulness/ mind wandering, using the MAAS, a 15-
item questionnaire (Brown and Ryan, 2003). A sample item is, “I
break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying attention,
or thinking of something else.” For the full scale, see Brown and
Ryan (2003). Higher scores on theMAAS are indicative of greater
mindfulness, or a reduced tendency to mind wander.
Results
Main analyses
Predicting accuracy and error types fromMAAS scores
Reliability of the MAAS in this sample was high (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.89). We performed regression analyses to test whether
MAAS scores predicted accuracy and error types. We ﬁrst tested
whether MAAS scores predicted overall performance on CRA
problems, regardless of problem-solving style. This was the
case. Higher MAAS scores predicted lower overall accuracy,
β = −0.25, t(69) = −2.14, p = 0.04. This eﬀect appeared to be
driven by increased errors of commission, β= 0.31, t(68)= 2.65,
p = 0.01, whereas no relationship was found between MAAS
scores and errors of omission, β=−0.15, t(68)=−1.22, p= 0.23.
Next, we tested our speciﬁc prediction of a diﬀerential
relationship between MAAS scores and creative problem-solving
performance as a function of problem-solving style. For problems
approached exclusively with insight (problems rated 4 on the
insight rating scale), higher MAAS scores predicted lower
accuracy, β = −0.25, t(66) = −2.04, p = 0.045 (see Figure 1).
Moreover, for these problems, higher MAAS scores predicted
more commission errors, β = 0.31, t(62) = 2.64, p = 0.01, but
were unrelated to omission errors, β = −0.01, t(65) = −1.01,
p = 0.92. In contrast, for problems approached exclusively
with analytic strategy (problems rated 1 on the insight rating
scale), higher MAAS scores predicted higher accuracy, β = 0.36,
t(63) = 3.03, p = 0.04 (see Figure 1). Moreover, MAAS scores
were not related to commission errors, β = 0.14, t(63) = 1.11,
p = 0.27, but predicted fewer omission errors, β = −0.38,
t(63)=−3.22, p= 0.002. Thus, taken together, the present results
show that individual diﬀerences in mind wandering/mindfulness
were related to general creative performance as well as how
eﬀective (in terms of accuracy) a given problem-solving style was
for participants.
For completeness, we also report the results for problems less
exclusively approached with insight or analytic strategy: When
participants reported having approached problems mostly with
insight (score 3 on the insight rating scale), MAAS scores did not
signiﬁcantly predict accuracy, β=−0.17, t(62)=−1.35, p= 0.18,
or commission errors, β = 0.01, t(62) = 0.07, p = 0.94, but
higher MAAS scores were associated with more omission errors,
β = 0.32, t(62) = 2.66, p = 0.01. When participants reported
having approached problems mostly with analytic strategy (score
2 on the insight rating scale), MAAS scores did not signiﬁcantly
predict accuracy, β = −0.16, t(60) = −1.24, p = 0.22, nor errors
of commission, β = 0.13, t(60) = 1.01, p = 0.32, or omission,
β = 0.06, t(60) = 0.49, p= 0.62.
Additional analyses
Predicting problem-solving styles from MAAS scores
Since individual diﬀerences in mind wandering/mindfulness
predicted the success (i.e., accuracy; speciﬁc errors) of problem
solving as a function of problem-solving style, one might
ask whether these individual diﬀerences also predicted which
problem-solving style was favored by participants. Average
frequencies of the four diﬀerent insight ratings were as follows:
1 (“just strategy”): M = 7.53, SD = 5.26; 2 (“mostly strategy”):
M = 6.00, SD = 4.38; 3 (“mostly insight”): M = 6.83, SD = 4.89;
4 (“just insight”): M = 9.64, SD = 5.72. Thus, participants used
the scale ends somewhat more often than the middle categories.
Overall, there was a slight trend for participants to more
frequently approach problems in an insightful manner; insight
ratings (M = 2.60, SD = 0.48) diﬀered marginally signiﬁcantly
from the hypothetical scale midpoint t(69) = 1.82, p = 0.07.
A regression analysis with MAAS scores as the independent
and problem-solving style as the dependent variable showed that
there was no relationship betweenMAAS scores and participants’
preferred problem-solving style, β = −0.05, t(69) = −0.43,
p= 0.67.
Insight ratings and problem solution rates
Examination of the insight ratings and solution rates for each
CRA problem (listed in Table 1) led to the observation that there
was a positive correlation between the two (r= 0.85). Also, as can
be seen in Figure 1, accuracy was noticeable higher for problems
approached exclusively with insight (problems rated 4 on the
insight rating scale; M = 0.63, SD = 0.38) than for problems
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TABLE 1 | Compound remote associate (CRA) problems used in Study 1.
Word 1 Word 2 Word 3 Solution Mean accuracy (SD) Mean insight rating (SD)
Ache Hunter Cabbage Head 0.51 (0.50) 2.64 (1.20)
Barrel Root Belly Beer 0.76 (0.43) 3.29 (1.02)
Bass Complex Sleep Deep 0.20 (0.40) 2.13 (1.09)
Big Leaf Shade Tree 0.71 (0.46) 2.71 (1.12)
Bite Monkey Widow Spider 0.53 (0.50) 2.61 (1.28)
Blade Witted Weary Dull 0.23 (0.42) 2.17 (1.13)
Board Magic Death Black 0.31 (0.47) 2.53 (1.13)
Broken Clear Eye Glass 0.54 (0.50) 2.59 (1.17)
Chocolate Fortune Tin Cookie 0.76 (0.43) 3.01 (1.10)
Falling Actor Dust Star 0.57 (0.50) 2.61 (1.20)
Foot Collection Out Stamp 0.09 (0.28) 2.09 (1.05)
Gold Stool Tender Bar 0.46 (0.50) 2.69 (1.23)
Hall Car Swimming Pool 0.67 (0.47) 3.14 (1.03)
Jump Kill Bliss Joy 0.16 (0.37) 2.10 (1.18)
Measure Desk Scotch Tape 0.73 (0.45) 2.64 (1.19)
Mouse Sharp Blue Cheese 0.51 (0.50) 2.37 (1.29)
Off Trumpet Atomic Blast 0.10 (0.30) 2.09 (1.11)
Playing Credit Report Card 0.79 (0.41) 3.19 (1.08)
Pure Blue Fall Water 0.41 (0.50) 2.57 (1.17)
Rabbit Cloud House White 0.33 (0.47) 2.23 (1.20)
Rock Times Steel Hard 0.39 (0.49) 2.34 (1.19)
Room Blood Salts Bath 0.59 (0.50) 2.59 (1.16)
Salt Deep Foam Sea 0.54 (0.50) 3.10 (1.00)
Sandwich Golf Foot Club 0.60 (0.49) 2.70 (1.12)
Square Cardboard Open Box 0.74 (0.44) 2.64 (1.10)
Stick Light Birthday Candle 0.67 (0.47) 2.79 (1.20)
Strap Pocket Time Watch 0.70 (0.46) 2.70 (1.13)
Surprise Wrap Care Gift 0.24 (0.43) 2.34 (1.10)
Thread Pine Pain Needle 0.61 (0.49) 2.80 (1.18)
Walker Main Sweeper Street 0.67 (0.47) 2.71 (1.18)
Accuracy scores and insight ratings collapsed over problems 0.50 (0.21) 2.60 (0.33)
Mean accuracy and insight ratings per problem (SD reported in parentheses).
solved exclusively with analytic strategy (problems rated 1 on
the insight rating scale; M = 0.25, SD = 0.26), F(1,68) = 45.42,
p < 0.001. Since the likelihood of solution success might
be an indicator of problem diﬃculty, this correlation raises
the question of whether problem diﬃculty might account
for the diﬀerential relationship between mindfulness/mind
wandering and problem solving with insight versus analysis.
To investigate this possibility, we grouped problems into easy
and diﬃcult problems using a median split, and then repeated
our critical analyses. We still found that higher MAAS scores
still predicted lower accuracy for problems solved with insight
(rated 4 on the insight scale), whether problems were relatively
easy [β = −0.22, t(61) = −1.73, p = 0.09; marginally
signiﬁcant) or relatively diﬃcult [β = −0.29, t(62) = −2.42,
p = 0.02]. Moreover, higher MAAS scores still predicted
greater accuracy for problems solved analytically (rated 1 on
the insight scale), whether the problems were relatively easy
[β = 0.31, t(57) = 2.47, p = 0.02], or relatively diﬃcult
[β = 0.29, t(60) = 2.30, p = 0.03]. Thus, we rule out
problem diﬃculty as an alternative explanation for the diﬀerential
relationship between mindfulness/mind wandering and insight
versus analytic problem solving.
Discussion
The results from Study 1 indicated that, overall, a greater
tendency toward mindfulness (or a reduced tendency to
mind wander) was associated with decreased problem-solving
performance. However, closer examination of the data based
on self-reported problem-solving approaches showed that this
negative relationship was present only for problems approached
exclusively with insight, while a positive relationship between
mindfulness and problem solving performance was found
for problems approached with analytic strategy. These results
conﬁrm our diﬀerential relationship prediction.
Examination of the types of errors participants made revealed
a similarly divergent pattern; Higher mindfulness (or a reduced
tendency to mind wander) was associated with more frequent
commission errors overall. This remained the case for problems
approached with insight, but not for problems approached with
analytic strategy. This pattern of results can be interpreted to
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FIGURE 1 | Regression lines illustrating the relationship between
mindfulness scores and accuracy for compound remote associate
(CRA) problems reported to have been approached exclusively with
insight and problems reported to have been approached exclusively
with analytic strategy.
suggest that participants high inmindfulness did not rely asmuch
on unconscious associative processes (which are associated with
omission errors) when attempting to solve creative problems—
and in particular when approaching them with insight—but
may instead have relied more strongly on accessing conscious
information (which leads to commission errors; Kounios et al.,
2008). This tendency may explain why the insight approach is not
a successful approach for people high in mindfulness.
A potential limitation of Study 1 was that problem-solving
approaches were classiﬁed based on participants’ post hoc self-
reports. While previous research shows that such self-reports are
reliable in that they correspond to distinct patterns of neural
activity taking place even before a report is made (Bowden
and Jung-Beeman, 2003; Kounios et al., 2006; Kounios and
Beeman, 2009), it remains a possibility that the self-reports in
the present study were inﬂuenced by thought processes that took
place during or before the problem-solving process but are not
necessarily directly involved in the act of problem solving. For
instance, participants may have inferred having approached a
problem in an insightful manner if they experienced feelings
of ﬂuency or positive aﬀect (see Subramaniam et al., 2009;
Topolinski and Reber, 2010). Moreover, although we did not
ﬁnd that diﬀerences in mindfulness/mind wandering predicted
diﬀerences in participants’ dominant problem solving styles, it is
possible that diﬀerences related to mindfulness/mind wandering
could aﬀect the reliability of participants’ self-reports. Therefore,
In Study 2, we chose to experimentally manipulate problem-
solving styles by instructing participants to approach problems
in an insightful or analytic manner.
Study 2
Most previous studies have only measured rather than instructed
problem-solving styles in CRA problems. However, in one
previous study, participants were presented with both solvable
CRA problems and incoherent word triads and were either
instructed to search for a solution word, or to simply read or
read and memorize the word triads (Topolinski and Strack,
2008). Search instructions eliminated spontaneous semantic
spreading (as evidenced by reduced priming of solution words).
This can be taken to suggest that instructions to search for
the solution reduces the likelihood of spontaneous insights. In
other studies, more speciﬁc explicit instructions have been used
to induce diﬀerent performance strategies on tasks that did
not—as with CRA problems—involve the internal search for
a solution in memory, but the search of an external stimulus
among other stimuli. Smilek et al. (2006b), for example, (see
also Snodgrass et al., 1995; Smilek et al., 2006a) aimed to
manipulate participants’ cognitive strategies when searching
for a visual target among distractors. Participants were either
instructed to remain passive and simply let the target item “pop
into their mind”—a process strongly reminiscent of an insight
experience—or to “direct their attention” in a more controlled
way and “search” actively for the target—a process resembling the
analytic approach to creative problem-solving. The researchers
found that participants performed better when they used the
passive, or insight, approach then when actively searching for the
target.
We do not imply the same cognitive processes involved in
the internal search for a solution in memory are involved in
searching for stimuli in the external environment. However,
these studies compellingly demonstrate that explicit instructions
can inﬂuence how people approach search tasks. We used
instructions similar to those by Smilek et al. (2006b) to induce an
insightful versus analytic approach to solving CRA problems. As
in Study 1, we predicted that individuals with a greater tendency
toward mindfulness would perform better when approaching
problems with analytic strategy, but worse when approaching
problems through insight. To test whether one or both types
of instructions led to changes in task performance, we also
included a control condition in which participants received no
instructions regarding their problem-solving approach.
Method
Participants
Participants were again recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk. Hundred-twenty participants completed the study. As
in Study 1, participants were excluded from analyses if they
failed to solve a single remote associates problem. Twenty-one
participants were removed for that reason, leaving 99 participants
in the analyses (42 male, 57 female, average age = 38 years,
SD = 12). All participants resided in the USA. The average
education level was equivalent to a bachelor’s degree.
Design
The study employed the following nested design. (1) Participants
were assigned to one of two groups; a control group,
which did not receive instructions regarding their problem-
solving approach, and an instruction group, which did receive
instructions. The choice for this between-group manipulation
was made in order to have a “naïve” control group, which is
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not inﬂuenced by knowledge of or experience with diﬀerent
problem-solving instructions. (2) Instructions to employ an
insight or analytic problem-solving approach were varied within
participants in the instruction group; Participants received one
type of instruction for a ﬁrst block of the problem-solving task,
and the other type of instruction for the second block. The
order in which the two types of instructions were presented was
counterbalanced. This within-participants manipulation served
to reduce confounds between the instructed problem-solving
style and pre-existing individual diﬀerences in problem-solving
styles or ability.
Procedure and Materials
Creative problem solving was again measured using the CRA
task. After general introductory task instructions, participants in
the control group directly continued to the task. In the instruction
group, participants received the following additional instructions
before continuing to the task: “There are diﬀerent approaches to
solving this task. In the current study, we want to ﬁnd out which
one is the most eﬀective. We divided the task into two blocks. We
would like you to use a diﬀerent approach in each block. Each
approach will be explained in detail before the beginning of the
block. Please try to follow the instructions as closely as possible,
even if you ﬁnd that the instructed strategy does not feel natural
or eﬀective to you.”
Before each block of CRA problems, participants in the
instruction condition received one of the following instructions
(underlined parts highlight words speciﬁc to the insight vs.
analytic approach). Insight approach:
“One way to solve this task is to be as receptive and as
possible and let the right answer “pop” into your mind. The
idea is to let your intuition determine your response. For
instance: Do not try to make exhaustive mental lists of
words associated to each of the three words on the screen.
Instead, just look at the words on the screen and wait for potential
answers to “pop up.” Sometimes people ﬁnd it diﬃcult or strange
to tune into their “gut feelings,” but we would like you to try
your best. Remember, it is very critical for this experiment that you
respond intuitively and let the answer just “pop” into your mind.”
Analytic strategy approach:
“One way to solve this task is to be as active and as
possible and to “search” for the right answer. The idea is to
let systematic eﬀort and strategy determine your response.
For instance: Try to make exhaustive mental lists of
words associated to each of the three words on the screen.
Start with the ﬁrst word on the screen. List all the associated words
you can think of. Then move to the second and then the third word
on the screen and do the same. Sometimes people ﬁnd it diﬃcult
or strange to “search systematically,” but we would like you to try
your best. Remember, it is very critical for this experiment that
you actively and systematically search for the answer.”
All participants were presented with 48 CRA problems split
into two blocks of 24 (see Table 2 for the stimulus materials).
The problems were presented in randomized order, and the
presentation format of the problems was the same as in Study 1.
TABLE 2 | Compound remote associate problems used in Study 2.
Word 1 Word 2 Word 3 Solution Mean accuracy (SD)
Ache Hunter Cabbage Head 0.60 (0.49)
Bass Complex Sleep Deep 0.23 (0.42)
Big Leaf Shade Tree 0.74 (0.44)
Blade Witted Weary Dull 0.23 (0.42)
Board Magic Death Black 0.40 (0.49)
Broken Clear Eye Glass 0.59 90.50)
Chamber Mask Natural Gas 0.47 (0.50)
Chocolate Fortune Tin Cookie 0.80 (0.40)
Date Alley Fold Blind 0.32 (0.47)
Dive Light Rocket Sky 0.23 (0.42)
Dream Break Light Day 0.53 (0.50)
Envy Golf Beans Green 0.64 (0.48)
Falling Actor Dust Star 0.73 (0.45)
Folk Bird Swan Song 0.63 (0.49)
Force Line Mail Air 0.20 (0.40)
Foul Ground Mate Play 0.17 (0.38)
Fox Man Peep Hole 0.41 (0.50)
Hall Car Swimming Pool 0.74 (0.44)
Health Taker Less Care 0.31 (0.47)
Hound Pressure Shot Blood 0.49 (0.50)
Lift Light Rocket Sky 0.42 (0.50)
Magic Plush Floor Carpet 0.68 (0.47)
Manners Round Tennis Table 0.71 (0.46)
Measure Desk Scotch Tape 0.81 (0.40)
Mouse Sharp Blue Cheese 0.55 (0.50)
Nuclear Feud Album Family 0.54 (0.50)
Peach Arm Tar Pit 0.44 (0.50)
Playing Credit Report Card 0.76 (0.43)
Rabbit Cloud House White 0.43 (0.50)
Right Cat Carbon Copy 0.31 (0.47)
River Note Account Bank 0.62 (0.49)
Rock Times Steel Hard 0.68 (0.47)
Salt Deep Foam Sea 0.58 (0.50)
Sandwich Golf Foot Club 0.48 (0.50)
Sea Home Stomach Sick 0.51 (0.50)
Shopping Hand Wheel Cart 0.71 (0.46)
Sleeping Bean Trash Bag 0.76 (0.43)
Sore Shoulder Sweat Cold 0.23 (0.42)
Square Cardboard Open Box 0.80 (0.40)
Strap Pocket Time Watch 0.77 (0.42)
Surprise Wrap Care Gift 0.25 (0.44)
Test Runner Map Road 0.33 (0.47)
Thread Pine Pain Needle 0.69 (0.47)
Trip House Goal Field 0.19 (0.40)
Type Ghost Screen Writer 0.48 (0.50)
Way Board Sleep Walk 0.30 (0.46)
Widow Bite Monkey Spider 0.68 (0.47)
Zone Still Noise Quiet 0.33 (0.47)
Insight scores collapsed over problems 0.51 (0.15)
Mean accuracy per problem (SD reported in parentheses).
At the end of the task, participants in the instruction condition
were asked to report on a 7-point scale how natural they found
each problem-solving approach and how eﬀective they thought
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each approach was. Finally, we again administered the MAAS
(Brown and Ryan, 2003).
Results
Main analyses
Predicting accuracy and error types fromMAAS scores
Reliability of the MAAS in this sample was high (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.90). We performed regression analyses to test
whether MAAS scores predicted accuracy and error types in
the diﬀerent conditions. First, in the control group, we found
that greater MAAS scores predicted lower accuracy, β = −0.43,
t(32) = −2.63, p = 0.01 (see Figure 2). MAAS scored did
not signiﬁcantly predict errors of commission, β = 0.28,
t(31) = 1.61, p = 0.12, or omission, β = 0.08, t(31) = 0.44,
p= 0.66.
Next, we tested our speciﬁc hypothesis that individual
diﬀerences in the tendency to mind wander or be mindful
diﬀerently predict creative performance depending on the
problem-solving style used to approach a problem. Following
analytic strategy instructions, higher MAAS scores predicted
greater accuracy β = 0.27, t(62) = 2.21, p = 0.03 (see Figure 2).
Moreover, higher MAAS scores predicted reduced commission
errors, β = −0.29, t(64) = −1.39, p = 0.02, and were unrelated
to omission errors, β = 0.10, t(64) = 0.82, p = 0.42. Following
insight instructions, MAAS scores were unrelated to accuracy,
β = 0.09, t(62) = 0.72, p= 0.47 (see Figure 2). Moreover, higher
MAAS scores predicted reduced commission errors, β = −0.26,
t(64) = −2.18, p = 0.03, but increased errors of omission,
β = 0.30, t(64)= 2.47, p= 0.02.
Additional analyses
Eﬀects of instructions on performance
Because using explicit instructions to induce distinct problem-
solving approaches is a novel methodological approach in
the context of creative problem solving, we examined how
FIGURE 2 | Regression lines illustrating the relationship between
mindfulness scores and accuracy for CRA problems in the control
condition, following insight instructions, and following analytic
instructions.
participants in the instruction group evaluated the two problem-
solving approaches and whether instructions aﬀected accuracy on
the attempted CRA problems. Repeated measures ANOVAs on
participants evaluations of the two approaches showed that they
found the insight approach (M = 5.55, SD = 1.43) more natural
than the analytic strategy approach (M = 3.95, SD = 1.62),
F(1,65) = 26.62, p < 0.001, and that they thought that the
insight approach (M = 5.05, SD = 1.46) was more eﬀective than
the analytic approach (M = 4.35, SD = 1.44), F(1,65) = 6.77,
p= 0.01.
Next, we performed within- and between-participants
analyses to test whether out instructions aﬀected accuracy.
First, a repeated-measures ANOVA with the factor instruction
performed on the data from the instruction group yielded no
diﬀerence in accuracy between analytic (M = 0.50, SD = 0.17)
and insight trials (M = 0.50, SD = 0.16), F(1,65) = 0.02,
p = 0.90. This remained the case after entering participants
responses of how natural and eﬀective they found each approach
as covariates, F(1,65) = 0.07, p = 0.80. Additional repeated-
measures ANOVAwere performed to examine the types of errors
made in the diﬀerent conditions. There were not diﬀerences in
commission errors between analytic (M = 0.34, SD = 0.03) and
insight trials (M = 0.32, SD = 0.03), F(1,65) = 1.44, p = 0.24.
However, analytic trials led to slightly more omission errors
(M = 0.18, SD= 0.02) than insight trials (M = 0.16, SD= 0.02),
F(1,65)= 4.09, p= 0.047.
There was no eﬀect of the order in which the diﬀerent
instructions were administered on accuracy, F(1,64) = 0.08,
p = 0.78, errors of commission, F(1,64) = 1.31, p = 0.26,
or omission, F(1,64) = 3.79, p = 0.06, and no interaction of
instruction and order on accuracy, F(1,64) = 0.01, p = 0.91, or
errors of commission, F(1,64) = 0.55, p = 0.42, or omission,
F(1,64)= 2.05, p= 0.16.
Moreover, an ANOVA comparing the two participants groups
showed that accuracy in the instruction group (M = 0.50,
SD = 0.14) did not diﬀer from that in the control group
who received no instructions regarding their problem-solving
approach (M = 0.53, SD= 0.15), F(1,97)= 0.75, p= 0.39. There
were also no diﬀerences in commission errors (instruction group:
M = 0.33, SD = 0.20; control group: M = 0.30, SD = 0.19),
F(1,97) = 0.57, p = 0.45, or omission errors (instruction group:
M = 0.17, SD = 0.14; control group: M = 0.17, SD = 0.17),
F(1,97) = 0.02, p = 0.89. Thus, taken together, these tests
provide evidence that, while participants preferred the insight
approach in their evaluations, instructions to follow any of the
two approaches did not aﬀect participants’ success at solving CRA
problems or the types of errors they made.
Discussion
Study 2 investigated the relationship between mindfulness/mind
wandering and creative problem solving after diﬀerent problem-
solving styles were instructed rather than adopted spontaneously.
When participants did not receive instructions, a greater
tendency toward mindfulness (or a reduced tendency to mind
wander) predicted decreased creative performance. This is
consistent the results from Study 1, where we found the same
relationship when analyzing performance collapsed over the
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diﬀerent self-reported problem-solving styles. Mindfulness did
not signiﬁcantly predict errors observed in the no-instruction
condition, though numerically the results for the types of errors
made are similar to those in Study 1 collapsed over problem-
solving styles, and the non-signiﬁcant relationship between
mindfulness and commission errors in this study may be due to a
lack of power in the no-instruction condition due to the smaller
sample size.
When participants received instructions to adopt a particular
problem solving approach, we found that mindfulness/mind
wandering was diﬀerentially related to problem solving as a
function of the speciﬁc approach. When participants were
instructed to approach problems with analytic strategy, a greater
tendency toward mindfulness predicted enhanced performance.
This ﬁnding is in line with the results of Study 1. For
problems approached with insight, we found no relationship
between mindfulness/mind wandering and performance. This
latter ﬁnding diﬀered from the result found in Study 1 for
self-reported insight problems. However, taken together, the
results are in line with the prediction that individual diﬀerences
in mindfulness/mind wandering diﬀerentially predict problem-
solving performance as a function of the problem solving
approach.
The results for the types of errors participants made in
the instruction condition also diﬀered from those observed in
Study 1. Here, we found that higher mindfulness was associated
with reduced, rather than increased, commission errors, and
this was true under analytic as well as insight instructions.
These discrepancies in the ﬁndings of Studies 1 and 2 suggest
the approaches participants adopted following our instructions
were likely not identical to those adopted spontaneously (i.e.,
in Study 1). It is likely that instructions to approach a problem
with insight may be particularly diﬃcult to follow. Instructions
to intentionally use a particular strategy (e.g., making mental lists
of associated words) appear more concrete and hence easier to
follow than instructions to refrain from using such a strategy (i.e.,
being receptive and waiting for a solution to come to mind).
Diﬃculty following insight instructions may also explain the
absence of a relationship between mindfulness and performance
in the insight condition in this study. Nonetheless, the fact
that our data showed that the two types of instructions led to
diﬀerent relationships between mindfulness and performance
(as predicted), without changing average performance scores,
gives some conﬁdence that such instructions can be a useful
tool to investigate the mechanisms and consequences of diﬀerent
problem-solving approaches.
General Discussion
In past research, the question of how individual diﬀerences
related to attention aﬀect creative performance has received
mixed answers. Some studies have provided indirect evidence
(Kasof, 1997; Carson et al., 2003; White and Shah, 2006,
2011; Fink et al., 2012) and others more direct evidence
(Baird et al., 2012; Baas, 2015) that a tendency toward
mind wandering increases creativity. At the same time, other
research suggests that mindfulness can be associated with greater
creative performance (Ostaﬁn and Kassman, 2012). Given that
mind wandering and mindfulness have been characterized as
opposing constructs (Mrazek et al., 2012b), the respective
conclusions that each can enhance creativity would seem to
be at odds with one another. However, when examining the
literature closely, it appears that diﬀerent mechanisms have
been brought up to account for the mixed results. It has
been speculated that mind wandering facilitates creativity by
stimulating unconscious associative processes that can lead to
a sudden insight (Baird et al., 2012). On the other hand,
it has been speculated that mindfulness increases creativity
because it reduces the tendency to rely on habitual responses
during the search for a creative solution (Ostaﬁn and Kassman,
2012). This latter explanation seems to imply that the analytic
route is used to ﬁnd a solution. Thus, both these theories
may be consistent with each other when considering insight
and analytic strategies as distinct paths to creative problem
solving.
Based on this premise, we predicted that a reduced
tendency toward mindfulness, or a greater tendency toward
mind wandering, increases problem solving when problems
were approached in an insightful way, but impair problem-
solving when problems are approached in an analytic way.
The results from the present studies support this hypothesis.
While higher mindfulness scores predicted decreased creative
problem solving overall (Studies 1 and 2), a more nuanced
picture emerged when examining analytic and insight solutions
separately. Greater mindfulness was consistently associated with
increased problem solving performance when problems were
approached with analytic strategy, whether this strategy was
spontaneously adopted (Study 1) or instructed (Study 2). In
contrast, the relationship between mindfulness and problem
solving was negative when participants spontaneously adopted an
insight approach (Study 1), and absent when they were instructed
to approach problems with insight (Study 2).
In the present studies, we chose to both measure and
experimentally manipulate approaches to creative problem
solving to provide convergent evidence for our prediction from
diﬀerent research methods. While the two methods largely
yielded similar results, some discrepancies emerged in the results
related to insight solving. Moreover, both methods have diﬀerent
strengths and limitations, which may explain the discrepant
ﬁndings.
In Study 1, we measured spontaneously adopted problem
solving approaches using self-reports, because previous research
has shown that such self-reports are reliable in that they
correspond to diﬀerent kinds of (preceding) neural activation
(Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003; Kounios et al., 2006; Kounios
and Beeman, 2009). However, we cannot rule out that these
self-reports are inﬂuenced by incidental thought processes
taking place during or before the problem-solving process
rather than reﬂecting processes directly involved in the act
of problem solving. Moreover, since we examined insight and
analytic problem solving in relation to individual diﬀerences
in mindfulness/mind wandering, a concern was that these
individual diﬀerences might be related to diﬀerences in the
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reliability of participants’ self-reports, which would present a
confound.
In Study 2, we experimentally manipulated problem-solving
approaches through instructions to rule out such confounds.
However, instructions can be hard to follow, especially when
they try to emulate spontaneous cognitive phenomena such as
having a sudden insight. While the diﬀerent types of instructions
in Study 2 led to diﬀerent results, we suspect based on the
pattern of results that the insight instructions were less eﬀective
at inducing an insight approach than the analytic instructions
were in inducing analytic strategy. In conclusion, we think that
the method of experimentally manipulating problem-solving
approaches through instructions is a promising method for
examining diﬀerences between approaches, but can be further
improved, and may be most fruitful when combined with self-
reports.
Our ﬁnding that an increased tendency to mind wander (or
a lesser tendency to be mindful) was associated with increased
insight solving in particular is in line with a recent study
examining the processes that lead to real-life creative ideas in
professional writers and elite theoretical physicists (Gable et al.,
unpublished manuscript). For 2 weeks, the writers and physicists
were asked to write daily diary reports in which they wrote down
their work-related ideas and responded to questions about the
circumstances under which these ideas occurred. This included
whether they had been mind wandering, and whether ideas were
associated with an “aha” experience, or a feeling of insight. The
results showed that a substantial proportion of the ideas occurred
while mind-wandering, and of these ideas, the majority were
associated with aha experiences. Thus, like the present ﬁndings,
these results point to a speciﬁc advantage of mind wandering for
achieving creative insights.
To date, most research on the consequences of mind
wandering has focused exclusively on negative consequences,
including impaired performance on a range of tasks (e.g.,
Mrazek et al., 2012a; Randall et al., 2014) and negative mood
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Only few studies have pointed
to beneﬁts of mind wandering (e.g., Baird et al., 2012; Franklin
et al., 2013; Gable et al., unpublished manuscript; see also
Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013). A similar imbalance exists with
regard to mindfulness. Studies have demonstrated wide-ranging
beneﬁts ofmindfulness, involving cognitive functioning andwell-
being (e.g., Brown and Ryan, 2003; Brown et al., 2007), but have
mostly neglected the question of potential costs. The present
research contributes to a more nuanced view on mind wandering
and mindfulness by showing that there are speciﬁc operations
for which mind wandering is beneﬁcial and mindfulness costly.
In a similar vein, a recent study investigated the relationship
between mindfulness and intuition (Remmers et al., 2014).
Participants were asked to make coherence judgments over
solvable and unsolvable CRA problems, and intuition was deﬁned
as showing above-chance accuracy without having conscious
access to problem solutions. The results showed that higher
mindfulness was associated with reduced intuition. This result
ﬁts well with the present ﬁndings, and supports the idea that
mindfulness speciﬁcally impairs performance aspects that rely on
intuitive thinking or spontaneous insights. Future research may
help further examine the particular cognitive operations that are
facilitated or impaired by mindfulness, and thereby further our
understanding of the concept.
Future Directions
The ﬁndings as well as the limitations of the present studies point
to interesting new directions for future research. For one, the
present studies have focused speciﬁcally on insight and analytic
search as two distinct creative processes that we expected to
beneﬁt diﬀerently from the ability to mindfully focus attention.
To get a more complete understanding of the relationship
between mindfulness/mind wandering and creativity, it would
be useful to examine other creative processes. For instance,
researchers have distinguished between idea generation and idea
selection (Ritter et al., 2012). Coming up with as many creative
ideas as possible likely beneﬁts from broad attention, while
selecting the best idea among the host of ideas one has generated
likely requires much more focused attention. Thus, based on
the current theory and ﬁndings, we would predict that idea
generation should beneﬁt from a tendency to mind wander,
while idea selection should beneﬁt from a tendency toward
mindfulness. Similarly, researchers have distinguished between
cognitive ﬂexibility and persistence as two distinct routes to
creative performance (Nijstad et al., 2010). We would predict
that mind wandering may beneﬁt creativity through increased
cognitive ﬂexibility, while mindfulness may beneﬁt creativity by
supporting greater persistence.
Another important task for future research is to examine
how diﬀerent operationalizations of mindfulness and mind
wandering relate to creative processes. In the present research, we
have focused only on dispositional mindfulness/mind wandering
assessed through a self-report measure. This allows for potential
confounds; the diﬀerences we found in insight and analytic
problem solving could be explained by a third variable that
is related to diﬀerences in mindfulness/mind wandering, such
as working memory (e.g., McVay and Kane, 2009; De Dreu
et al., 2012; Wiley and Jarosz, 2012; Mooneyham and Schooler,
2013). It would therefore be useful to investigate whether
experimentally induced diﬀerences in mindfulness resulting, for
instance, from mindfulness meditation exercises (Ostaﬁn and
Kassman, 2012), or diﬀerences in mind wandering resulting from
diﬀerent contextual demands (Baird et al., 2012) also lead to
distinct beneﬁts for insight and analytic problem solving.
On a related note, our investigation was based on a particular
conceptualization of mindfulness. We deﬁned mindfulness as
mindful attention and awareness, and thus in opposition to mind
wandering. There are admittedly other aspects to mindfulness
that may not necessarily be related to mind wandering and to
creativity in the same way. For instance, Baas et al. (2014) have
demonstrated that, whereas the ability to focus attention and
act with awareness was associated with decreased creativity, the
ability to mindfully observe and attend to various stimuli was
associated with increased creativity. Thus, it would be interesting
to investigate whether the ability to mindfully observe and attend
to stimuli relates diﬀerently to insight and analytic approaches to
creative problem solving. Since the analytic strategy approach is
largely conscious and involves considering and rejecting potential
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solutions, this approach might beneﬁt from mindful observation,
whereas the largely unconscious processes leading to insights
might not.
Conclusion
Researchers and laypeople alike have brought up the question
of what makes some individuals more creative than others,
and studies have provided an abundance of mixed and often
indirect evidence linking individual diﬀerences in traits related
to mind wandering or mindfulness to creativity. The present
results illustrate that, to understand how such traits impact
creative performance, it is important to understand creativity
as a process that can be approached in diﬀerent ways. While
a tendency to be mindful appears to beneﬁt creativity when
a creative task is approached in a conscious, analytic way, it
harms creative performance when the task is approached in
a more insightful way. Thus, both our stereotypes of creative
individuals highly focused individuals and as chaotic, scattered
minds seem to have merit, but they speak to diﬀerent creative
processes.
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